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Abstract
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate
positive worker rents and, consequently, ine!ciently low eort. We
show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context.
The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may
exploit workers’ future rents to induce excessively high eort.
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1 Introduction
As is well-known in economics, minimum wages are ine!cient for at least
two reasons: On an aggregate level, they may prevent labor market clearing,
and on a disaggregate level, they can imply ine!ciently low eort. The latter
problem has been highlighted by contract-theoretic models analyzing moral-
hazard problems under limited liability (see, among many others, Laont and
Martimort, 2002, chapter 4; Schmitz 2005): When agents are protected by
minimum wages or limited liability, they usually earn positive rents under an
incentive contract. These rents raise the principal’s costs of eliciting eort.
Consequently, he optimally induces less than first-best eort.
We show that this conclusion may no longer hold in a dynamic setting.
To do so, we also consider a moral-hazard problem under minimum wages,
which leads to positive rents and ine!ciently low eort in a static model.
However, in a two-period model, the principal optimally uses second-period
rents to generate extra incentives for the agent in the first period. This is
achieved by combining a bonus contract with an extension clause that allows
the agent to sign a second-period contract only if he was successful in the
first period. When the expected second-period rent is large, the principal
uses the extra incentives to induce more than first-best eort.
In practice, this "reversed" ine!ciency problem of minimum wages (i.e.,
excessively large eorts) should typically apply to low-skilled blue-collar work-
ers. The introduction of minimum wages that are enforced by law (or col-
lective agreements) usually compels firms to increase wages for unskilled
labor, whereas wages for high-skilled employees are unaected because they
already earn more than the minimum wage. Translating this to our model
means that, for low-skilled workers, the minimum wage constraint is bind-
ing. Hence, blue-collar workers are likely to earn rents in a one-shot game.
In a dynamic environment, firms then optimally respond by exploiting these
rents, which may result in ine!ciently high eort.
The paper is related to the contract-theoretic literature on moral hazard
and limited liability, which usually considers a static relationship.1 Two ex-
1Note, however, that there is a rich literature on repeated moral hazard with risk averse
agents. Contrary to our paper, the focus of these models is on consumption smoothing
2
ceptions are Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2008) and Kräkel and Schöttner (2008),
who also analyze a two-period principal-agent relationship and show that the
principal employs future rents to generate extra incentives. However, in those
papers, the agent’s eort remains below first-best. We obtain a contrary re-
sult by considering a situation where the firm can replace the worker after
the first period.
2 The Model
A firm needs one worker to carry out a task in each of two periods. In each
period, the firm can randomly hire a worker from a pool of homogeneous
agents available on the labor market. Alternatively, in period 2, the firm
may again employ the worker hired in period 1. However, only one-period
contracts are feasible because the firm cannot commit not to renegotiate
contractual terms referring to period 2 at the beginning of the second period.
All players are risk neutral. The monetary output of the worker hired in
period w (w = 1> 2) is yw\w with \w 5 {0> 1} and Pr[\w = 1|hw] = s(hw). The
variable hw denotes the worker’s eort in period w, and s(hw) is a concave
probability function with s0 (hw) A 0 and s00 (hw) ? 0. At the beginning of
w = 1, the firm knows y1. However, due to uncertainty about the future,
y2 is still unknown and considered to be the realization of a non-negative
random variable y with commonly known cdf I (·). The firm learns y2 at the
beginning of w = 2.
Eort is not observable, but output \w is verifiable. Hence, at the begin-
ning of period w, the firm oers a worker a bonus contract (eOw> eKw) contingent
on output \w, where the low bonus eOw is paid to the worker if \w = 0, and
the high bonus eKw if \w = 1. The firm’s payment to the worker must be
at least as high as the minimum wage, which is normalized to zero in both
periods. Thus, eKw> eOw  0. To supplement the period-1 bonus contract, the
firm announces a probability t 5 [0> 1] of hiring the period-1 worker again in
period 2, provided that the worker achieved a high output in period 1, i.e.,
if \1 = 1.2
and the renegotiation of long-term contracts.
2Note that such an extension clause is renegotiation-proof: At the beginning of period
3
In each period, workers have a reservation value x¯  0. Exerting eort
hw entails cost f (hw) with f (0) = f0 (0) = f00 (0) = 0 and f0 (hw) > f00 (hw) A 0 for
all hw A 0. To guarantee that the firm is interested in hiring a worker and
implementing e!cient eort, we assume that yws(hIEw )f(hIEw ) A x¯ ,;yw, with
first-best eort hIEw being defined by yws0(hIEw ) = f0(hIEw ). Concavity of the
firm’s objective function in the second-best case is ensured by the technical
assumptions f000 (hw) A 0 and s000 (hw)  0.
The timeline for each period w is the following: First, the firm observes yw.
Then the firm oers a bonus contract (eOw> eKw) supplemented by an extension
probability t if w = 1. The worker accepts or rejects the contract. In case
of acceptance, the worker chooses eort hw. Finally, output is realized and
payos are made.
3 Solution to the Model
We solve the problem by first considering w = 2. If the worker has accepted
the contract (eO2> eK2), his expected utility is
HX2 (h2) = eO2 + (eK2  eO2) s (h2) f (h2) = (1)
Hence, the worker optimally chooses eort h2 given by
(eK2  eO2) = f0 (h2) @s0 (h2) = (2)
Therefore, the worker’s expected utility is
HX2 (h2) = eO2 +J (h2) with J (h2) :=
f0 (h2)
s0 (h2)
s (h2) f (h2) = (3)
The function J (h2) denotes the worker’s expected gain from exerting eort
h2, i.e., the resulting expected wage increase net of eort cost. J (h2) is
strictly increasing in h2.
The firm maximizes y2s (h2)eO2(eK2  eO2) s (h2), taking into account
the worker’s participation constraint (PC) HX2(h2)  x¯ and the minimum-
2, the firm is indierent between employing the period-1 worker for another period or
hiring a new worker.
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wage condition (MWC) eO2  0. Thus, using (3), the firm’s Lagrangian reads
as follows:3
O2 (eO2> eK2) = y2s (h2) eO2 J(h2) f(h2) + 1 [eO2 +J(h2) x¯] + 2eO2=
Maximization leads to our first result:4
Proposition 1 (i) If x¯ ? J (hW
2
) with hW
2
being implicitly defined by y2s0 (hW2)
f0 (hW
2
)J0 (hW
2
) = 0, only the MWC will be binding and the firm induces hW
2
.
(ii) If x¯ 5
£
J (hW
2
) > J
¡
hIE
2
¢¤
, both MWC and PC will be binding and the firm
implements hWW
2
with J (hWW
2
) = x¯. (iii) If x¯ A J
¡
hIE
2
¢
, then only the PC will
be binding and the firm implements hIE
2
. (iv) We have hW
2
? hWW
2
? hIE
2
.
The proposition shows that an increasing reservation value x¯ relaxes the
MWC, thus leading to higher implemented eort. The worker earns a positive
rent if and only if case (i) applies. Because hW
2
and, consequently, J (hW
2
) is
increasing in y2, case (i) occurs if y2 is su!ciently large. More precisely,
y2 needs to exceed the threshold yˆ implicitly defined by J (hW2(yˆ)) = x¯.
Since we are interested in situations where workers may earn rents, we
assume that y2 A yˆ occurs with positive probability. Thus, before un-
certainty about y2 is resolved, the expected rent of the period-2 worker is
U¯ := (1 I (yˆ)) (H [HX2 (hW2) |y A yˆ] x¯) A 0.
We now turn to the optimal contract for w = 1. The period-1 worker
earns U¯ in the second period if \1 = 1 and he is hired again in period 2
(which happens with probability t). Thus, a worker’s expected utility from
accepting a contract in w = 1 is given by
HX1 (h1) = eO1 + x¯+
¡
eK1  eO1 + U¯t
¢
s (h1) f (h1) .
Hence, the worker chooses eort according to eK1eO1+U¯t = f0 (h1) @s0 (h1).
For w = 1, the PC is HX1 (h1)  2x¯ and the MWC is eO1> eK1  0. In order to
rule out extreme cases where, in the absence of a minimum wage in period
3Note that eO2  0 together with (eK2  eO2) = f0 (h2) @s0 (h2) ensures that eK2  0.
Recall that h2 is a function of (eO2> eK2).
4All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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1, the firm would like to punish the worker for success (i.e., eK1 ? 0), let
U¯ ? x¯. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 Assume that U¯ ? x¯. In the optimal contract, the firm sets
t = 1. There exists a cut-o value xˆ ? J(hIE
1
) such that the firm implements
more than first-best eort, hIE
1
, if and only if x¯ A xˆ.
According to Proposition 2, the firm optimally combines a bonus contract
with an extension clause that guarantees a period-1 worker another contract
in w = 2 in case of success (i.e., \1 = 1). Thereby, the firm can use the
entire expected second-period rent U¯ to generate extra incentives in w = 1.
Formally, this means that the firm’s cost of inducing a given eort level h1
decreases by s(h1)U¯ relative to a situation without extension clause (i.e.,
t = 0). Consequently, the optimal period-1 eort is higher than under t = 0
or, equivalently, in a static employment setting. Moreover, if period-1 eort
would already be quite large without extension clause (i.e., x¯ A xˆ), extra
incentives due to contract extension lead to more than e!cient eort in
period 1.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We have
CO2
CeO2
= y2s0 (h2)
Ch2
CeO2
1[J0(h2)+f0(h2)]
Ch2
CeO2
+1

1 +J0(h2)
Ch2
CeO2
¸
+2 = 0
(4)
and
CO2
CeK2
= y2s0 (h2)
Ch2
CeK2
 [J0(h2) + f0(h2)]
Ch2
CeK2
+ 1J0(h2)
Ch2
CeK2
= 0= (5)
Adding both optimality conditions, using that, by (2),
Ch2
CeK2
=  s
0 (h2)
(eK2  eO2) s00 (h2) f00 (h2)
=  Ch2CeO2
A 0> (6)
yields 1 + 2 = 1. Hence, either (i) only the PC is binding, or (ii) only the
MWC, or (iii) both. In case (i) we have 2 = 0 and 1 = 1. Inserting into (5)
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shows that the firm implements first-best eort: y2s0
¡
hIE
2
¢
= f0
¡
hIE
2
¢
. From
the binding PC and the non-binding MWC eO2 A 0 we obtain J
¡
hIE
2
¢
? x¯.
In case (ii), 1 = 0, 2 = 1 and eO2 = 0. Inserting into (5) gives
y2s0 (h2) f0 (h2)J0 (h2) = 0= (7)
Obviously, the solution to (7), hW
2
, satisfies hW
2
? hIE
2
. The non-binding PC
yields J (hW
2
) A x¯. Finally, in case (iii), 1> 2 A 0 and eO2 = 0. From the
binding PC optimal eort in this scenario, hWW
2
, is characterized byJ (hWW
2
) = x¯.
Solving (5) for the multiplier 1 yields
1 = 1
y2s0 (hWW2 ) f0 (hWW2 )
J0 (hWW
2
)
= (8)
1 ? 1 implies that y2s0 (hWW2 ) f0 (hWW2 ) A 0 and, hence, hWW2 ? hIE2 . From (8)
and 1 A 0 we obtain
y2s0 (hWW2 ) f0 (hWW2 )J0 (hWW2 ) ? 0= (9)
Using that s000 ? 0 and f000 A 0, it is straightforward to verify that J(·) is a
convex function. Thus y2s (·)f (·)J (·) is concave in eort. Consequently,
comparison of (7) and (9) gives hWW
2
A hW
2
.
Proof of Proposition 2: Tomake the firm’s problems for the two periods easily
comparable and to be able to apply Proposition 1, we state the optimization
program in a general form that incorporates both periods w = 1> 2. In period
w, the firm’s problem is:
max
eKw>eOw>hw>t
yws (hw) eOw  (eKw  eOw) s (hw)
s.t. eKw  eOw =
f0 (hw)
s0 (hw)
 U¯t
eOw +
¡
eKw  eOw + U¯t
¢
s (hw) f (hw)  x¯
eOw> eKw  0
t = 0 if w = 2=
7
Inserting for eKweOw and using the definition for J (·) from (3), this problem
simplifies to
max
eOw>hw>t
£
yw + U¯t
¤
s (hw) eOw  [J (hw) + f (hw)]
s.t. eOw = max
½
x¯J (hw) > U¯t 
f0 (hw)
s0 (hw)
> 0
¾
t = 0 if w = 2>
where the expression for eOw follows from the PC and the MWC for eKw and
eOw, respectively. Note that
x¯J (hw) A U¯t 
f0 (hw)
s0 (hw)
/ x¯ U¯t A [s (hw) 1]
f0 (hw)
s0 (hw)
 f (hw)
is true since the right-hand side of the last inequality is negative and x¯ A U¯
by assumption. Hence, eKw  0 is satisfied and eOw = max {x¯J (hw) > 0}.
The firm’s problem can then be transformed to:
max
hw>t
( £
yw + U¯t
¤
s (hw) [J (hw) + f (hw)] if J (hw)  x¯£
yw + U¯t
¤
s (hw) [x¯+ f (hw)] otherwise
s.t. t = 0 if w = 2. Thus, the firm sets t = 1 in w = 1. To see that
the firm may induce h1 A hIE1 , assume for a moment that U¯ = 0. Then,
the optimal period-1 contract is equivalent to the optimal period-2 contract.
Hence, by Proposition 1, the firm would implement h1 = hIE1 if x¯ A J(hIE1 ).
Consequently, because U¯ A 0, there is a critical value xˆ such that h1 A hIE1
for all x¯ A xˆ. Moreover, xˆ ? J(hIE
1
).
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